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Abstract
This paper studies two important reasons why people violate procedure
invariance, loss aversion and scale compatibility. The paper extends previous research
on loss aversion and scale compatibility by studying loss aversion and scale
compatibility simultaneously, by looking at a new decision domain, medical decision
analysis, and by examining the effect of loss aversion and scale compatibility on
“well-contemplated preferences.” We find significant evidence both of loss aversion
and scale compatibility. However, the sizes of the biases due to loss aversion and
scale compatibility vary over trade-offs and most participants do not behave
consistently according to loss aversion or scale compatibility. In particular, the effect
of loss aversion in medical trade-offs decreases with duration. These findings are
encouraging for utility measurement and prescriptive decision analysis. There appear
to exist decision contexts in which the effects of loss aversion and scale compatibility
can be minimized and utilities can be measured that do not suffer from these
distorting factors.
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This paper studies two important explanations of why people’s preferences
deviate from procedure invariance, loss aversion and scale compatibility. Procedure
invariance is the requirement that logically equivalent ways of measuring preferences
yield identical results. For example, suppose we ask a client to specify how many
years in full health he considers equivalent to living for 40 years with a back injury
and he answers 30 years. Then procedure invariance requires that we obtain the same
indifference if we ask this client instead to specify the number of years with a back
injury that he considers equivalent to living for 30 years in full health. That is, the
client’s response to the latter question should be 40 years. Procedure invariance is a
basic requirement of normative decision analysis. Without procedure invariance,
preferences over decision alternatives cannot be measured unambiguously and, in the
absence of normative grounds to prefer one method of presenting alternatives over
another, the outcomes of decision analyses are equivocal.
Unfortunately, empirical research has displayed many systematic violations of
procedure invariance. People’s preferences have been shown to depend on the
framing of the outcomes ( Tversky and Kahneman 1986), the context in which
preferences are elicited (Tversky and Simonson 1993), and the response scale used
(Slovic 1975, Tversky, et al. 1988, Delquié 1993).
Two important models that can explain violations of procedure invariance are
the reference-dependent model ( Tversky and Kahneman 1991) and the contingent
trade-off model  (Tversky et al. 1988). The reference-dependent model posits that
people frame outcomes as gains and losses with respect to a given reference point,
which is often their current position. Reference-dependence in combination with loss
aversion can lead to violations of procedure invariance. The contingent trade-off
model explains violations of procedure invariance by scale compatibility: attributes of3
decision alternatives that are compatible with the response mode are weighted more
heavily than those that are not.
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of loss aversion and scale
compatibility in causing violations of procedure invariance. The paper extends
previous research on loss aversion and scale compatibility in three ways. First, we
study the effects of loss aversion and scale compatibility simultaneously. Previous
empirical studies typically focused either on loss aversion or on scale compatibility
but did not examine the interaction between the two effects. This may have led to
biased conclusions.  As we show in Section 3, loss aversion and scale compatibility
can interact in trade-offs. More robust tests of loss aversion and scale compatibility
are obtained by studying the two effects simultaneously. Performing systematic tests
of loss aversion and scale compatibility is important for decision analysis. If loss
aversion and/or scale compatibility turn out to follow specific patterns then it may
become possible to model these effects and to correct for them in utility measurement.
The analogy with the literature on probability transformation may illustrate this point.
In response to observed violations of expected utility theory, alternative models of
decision under risk have been proposed in which probabilities are weighted through a
probability transformation function ( Quiggin 1982). The empirical literature on
probability transformation has displayed systematic patterns in the way people distort
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu and Gonzalez
1996). Specific parametric forms have been proposed for the probability
transformation function that capture these systematic patterns ( Tversky and
Kahneman 1992, Lattimore, et al. 1992, Prelec 1998). Finally, it has been shown how
these parametric forms can be used to correct for probability transformation in utility
measurement ( Wakker and Stiggelbout 1995). Regarding loss aversion, several4
authors have used models in which loss aversion is constant (Tversky and Kahneman
1992, Shalev 1997).  Bleichrodt, et al. 2000 have derived how utilities should be
corrected for constant loss aversion and they have shown that these corrections reduce
the number of violations of procedure invariance.
Second, the paper extends previous research by studying loss aversion and
scale compatibility in a new domain, medical decision making. The little evidence
that is available on loss aversion and scale compatibility in medical trade-offs is
indirect and ambiguous. Two-attribute trade-offs are generally used in health utility
measurement and insight into the extent to which these trade-offs are affected by loss
aversion and scale compatibility may contribute to the validity of health utility
measures.
Third, we test to what extent loss aversion and scale compatibility are present
if an attempt is made to elicit well-contemplated preferences. Most previous studies
were primarily interested in whether loss aversion and scale compatibility existed and
used question formats that were conducive to violations of procedure invariance. For
example, most of these studies used matching to elicit indifference. It has been shown
that matching is more likely to lead to inconsistencies in preferences than choice-
based elicitation procedures ( Bostic, et al. 1990). Displaying the presence of
violations of procedure invariance is an important research topic. However, for
practical decision analysis it is also important to examine to what extent loss aversion
and scale compatibility are present under careful preference elicitation. The preferred
way to elicit well-contemplated preferences is by the constructive preference
approach (Payne, et al. 1999). However, the constructive preference approach is time
consuming and requires sophisticated clients and interviewers. Therefore, it is often
not feasible in practice. For example, in medical decision making utility elicitations5
are often performed by medical staff who lack both time and training to elicit
preferences by the constructive preference approach. In such cases, it is important to
use experimental procedures that are feasible and limit the impact of distorting factors
as much as possible. Testing to what extent such experimental procedures are
susceptible to loss aversion and scale compatibility is a third aim of this paper.
The paper has the following structure. The next two sections describe the
reference-dependent model and the contingent trade-off model. These two models are
applied in Section 3 to derive empirical tests of the effect of loss aversion with scale
compatibility held constant, of the effect of scale compatibility with loss aversion held
constant, and of the joint effect of loss aversion and scale compatibility. The latter test
is derived for decision contexts where loss aversion and scale compatibility make
conflicting predictions and therefore allows for an assessment of the relative strengths
of the two effects. Sections 4 and 5 are empirical and describes the design respectively
the results of an experiment aimed to perform the tests derived in Section 3. Section 6
concludes.
1.  The reference-dependent model
Let X be a set of outcomes. The set of outcomes X is a Cartesian product of the
attribute sets X1 and X2. The sets X1 and X2 are connected topological spaces and X is
endowed with the product topology. A typical element of X is (x1, x2), x1˛X1, x2˛X2.
Let a preference relation ¸ be defined over X, where ¸ is assumed to be a  continuous
weak order, i.e., it is transitive and complete and the sets {x˛X: x ¸ y} and {x˛X: x ˚
y} are both closed for all y˛X. The relation ¸ is the preference relation adopted by
standard choice theory. As usual, ￿ (strict preference) denotes the asymmetric part of
¸ and  ~ (indifference) the symmetric part. Preference relations over attributes are6
defined from ¸. Let x ia denote the outcome that yields x i on attribute i and a on the
other attribute. Then we define for i˛{1,2} and x ia, y ia ˛ X, x i ¸ y i iff x ia ¸ y ia
Throughout, we assume that the preference relation satisfies attribute monotonicity.
Definition 1 (attribute monotonicity):
The preference relation ¸ satisfies attribute monotonicity if for all x, y ˛ X with x j =
yj, j˛{1,2}, either
(a) xi > yi iff x ￿ y, i ˛{1,2}, i„j
or
(b) xi > yi iff x ¨ y, i ˛{1,2}, i„j
Reference-dependent theory modifies standard choice theory by making the
preference relation dependent on a given reference point. The reference point is often
the current position of the individual. Instead of one preference relation  ¸, as in
standard choice theory, there is a family of indexed preference relations ¸r, where x ¸r
y denotes “x is at least as preferred as y judged from reference point r.” The reference-
dependent relations of strict preference and indifference are denoted by  ￿r and  ~r
respectively. The preference relations  ¸r are continuous weak orders and satisfy
attribute monotonicity. The preference relations over single attributes are defined as
under the standard choice model. Under attribute monotonicity, thesingle-attribute
preference relations are independent of the reference point and we therefore denote
them as before by ¸.
The distinctive predictions of reference-dependent theory follow from the
assumptions about the impact of shifts in the reference point. Tversky and Kahneman7
(1991) hypothesize that preferences satisfy  loss aversion, which can be defined as
follows.
Definition 2 (loss aversion):
Let i,j˛{1,2}, i„j. The preference relation satisfies loss aversion if for all r,s,x,y˛X
such that xi = ri ￿  yi = si, and rj = sj, x ¸s y implies x ￿r y.
Figure 1: An Illustration of Loss Aversion
The intuition behind loss aversion is that losses loom larger than gains.
Because a shift in the reference point can change losses into gains and vice versa, loss
aversion can explain violations of procedure invariance. Figure 1 illustrates. Suppose
that x and y are equivalent judged from reference point s. That is, the gain y 2-s2 is just
sufficient to offset the gains x1-s1 and x 2-s2. If the reference point shifts from s to r








shift in the reference point does not affect the second attribute. Because losses loom
larger than gains and no change occurs on the second dimension, x is now strictly
preferred to y. If we draw indifference curves in Figure 1 then loss aversion implies
that the indifference curves judged from reference point r, ICr, are steeper than those
from reference point s, ICs.
Several empirical studies support loss aversion and closely related concepts as
“endowment effects” (Kahneman, et al. 1990) and “status quo bias” (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser 1988). Kühberger (1998) gives an overview of the impact of reference-
dependence and loss aversion on risky decisions. Illustrations of the influence of
reference-dependence and loss aversion on riskless decision making can, for example,
be found in Tversky and Kahneman (1991), Bateman et al. (Bateman, et al. 1997), and
Herne (Herne 1998).
2.  The contingent trade-off model
The contingent trade-off model (Tversky et al. 1988) generalizes standard choice
theory by making preferences conditional on the elicitation method used. In two-
attribute trade-offs, preferences can either be elicited by the first (x1) or by the second
(x2) attribute. Let ¸1 and ¸2 denote the preference relation when the first respectively
the second attribute is used as the response scale. For i=1,2, ￿i is the asymmetric part
of ￿i (strict preference) and ~i the symmetric part (indifference).  It is assumed that the
¸i, i=1,2, are continuous weak orders and satisfy attribute monotonicity. The
preference relations over single attributes are defined as under the standard choice
model. Under attribute monotonicity, the single-attribute preference relations are
independent of the response scale used and we therefore continue to denote them by
¸.9
The distinctive predictions of the contingent trade-off model are a
consequence of the effect of changes in the response scale. Tversky et al. (1988)
impose scale compatibility to explain why preferences depend on changes in the
response scale. Scale compatibility posits that an attribute becomes more important if
it is used as response scale. Formally, scale compatibility can be expressed as follows.
Definition 3 (scale compatibility)
If x, y ˛ X are such that for i,j˛{1,2}, i„j, xi ￿ yi and xj ¨ yj then x ¸j y implies x ￿i y.
Figure 2: An Illustration of Scale Compatibility
Figure 2 illustrates scale compatibility. The two preference relations ¸1 and ¸2
give rise to different sets of indifference curves IC1 and IC2. The indifference curves
corresponding to  ¸1, IC1, are steeper, reflecting that the first attribute gets more







same indifference curve when the second attribute is used as the response scale then x,
which yields a strictly preferred level on the first attribute, lies on a higher, i.e. more
preferred, indifference curve when the first attribute is used as the response scale.
Several studies have provided empirical support for scale compatibility.
Delquié (1993) gives a comprehensive overview of the impact of scale compatibility
on both decision under risk and decision under certainty. His results provide strong
support for scale compatibility.
Two of the abovementioned studies provide some insight into the relative
contribution of loss aversion and scale compatibility on trade-offs. The two studies
yield conflicting results. Delquié (1993), who focused on scale compatibility, argues
that the effect of scale compatibility is stronger than the effect of loss aversion.
Bateman et al. (1997), whose aim was to test the influence of loss aversion, conclude
that loss aversion is more important than scale compatibility.
3.  Empirical tests
We used a linked equivalence design to derive empirical tests of loss aversion
with scale compatibility constant, of scale compatibility with loss aversion constant,
and of the joint effect of loss aversion and scale compatibility. Consider two outcomes
x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2), suppose that for both attributes higher levels are preferred
to lower, and that x2 < y2. In the first stage of the linked-equivalence design, three of
the parameters x 1, x 2, y 1, and y 2 are fixed and participants were asked to establish
indifference between x and y by specifying the value of the remaining parameter.
Suppose that x1 is used to elicit indifference in the first stage and denote the first-stage
response by x1¢. It follows by attribute monotonicity that x1¢
 > y1. In the second stage,
x1¢ is substituted and one of x 1, x 2, and y 2 is used to establish indifference. Standard11
choice theory predicts that the second-stage response should always be equal to the
first-stage stimulus value. This follows immediately from transitivity of the
indifference relation and attribute monotonicity. The second-stage response predicted
by either the reference-dependent model or the contingent trade-off model can differ
from the first-stage stimulus value depending on which parameter is used to elicit
indifference. Table 1 provides an overview of the various possibiilities. A formal
derivation of these predictions is given in Appendix A. Let us state for completeness
that inequalities corresponding to an attribute reverse if that attribute is such that
lower levels are preferred to higher levels. For example, if lower levels are preferred
to higher levels on the first attribute then the reference-dependent model predicts that
y1 > y1¢¢.
Table 1: Predictions of the reference-dependent model (RDM) and the
contingent trade-off model (CTO)






y1 y1¢¢ >  y1 y1¢¢ =  y1
x2 x2¢¢ = x2 x2¢¢ > x2
y2 y2¢¢  > x2 y2¢¢  <  x2
NOTE: Second-stage responses are indicated by the symbol ¢¢.
Table 1 displays how two-attribute trade-offs can be used to test loss aversion
and scale compatibility. The use of y 1 to elicit indifference in the second stage of the
linked equivalence questions yields a “pure” test of loss aversion. In this case, the12
contingent trade-off model predicts that the effect of scale compatibility is held
constant. A pure test of scale compatibility is obtained if x 2 is used to elicit second-
stage responses. The reference-dependent model predicts that this test will not be
confounded by changes in loss aversion. Finally, the joint impact of scale
compatibility and loss aversion is tested if y 2 is used to elicit indifference in the
second stage. We study trade-offs where scale compatibility and loss aversion make
conflicting predictions. This allows tests of the relative size of the two effects.
4. Experiment
Participants
Fifty-one economics students at the University Pompeu Fabra, aged between
20 and 25 participated in the experiment. Participants were paid five thousand Pesetas
(approximately $30 at the time of the experiment). The experiment was carried out in
two personal interview sessions. The two sessions were separated by two weeks.
Before the actual experiment was administered, we tested the questionnaire in several
pilot sessions.
Questions
The experiment consisted of three groups of questions. We describe each
group of questions in turn.
Group 1: Back pain questions
In the first group of questions, health status was qualitative and participants
were asked to make trade-offs between years with back pain and years in full health.
Questions in which health status is qualitative are commonly used in health utility13
measurement. In Section 3, it was assumed that both attributes in the decision problem
can be used to elicit indifference. This implies that both attributes must satisfy certain
“richness conditions” (connectedness of the topological spaces) to ensure that such
indifference values can always be found. The richness conditions are unlikely to be
satisfied for qualitative health states. In health utility assessment utilities are therefore
elicited by varying only the quantitative attribute, generally duration. The impact of
scale compatibility can then not be tested, because the tests for scale compatibility
require shifts in the response scale used. Therefore, the first group of questions, to
which we refer as the “back pain questions” only tested for loss aversion. The back
pain questions were included because of the common use in health utility
measurement of questions with qualitative health status.
Table 2: The description of back pain
Unable to perform some tasks at home and/or at work
Able to perform all self care activities (eating, bathing, dressing) albeit with
some difficulties
Unable to participate in many types of leisure activities
Often moderate to severe pain and/or other complaints
Back pain was described to participants as level of functioning on four
dimensions: daily activities, self care, leisure activities, and pain. Table 2 shows the
description of back pain. This description was taken from the Maastricht Utility
Measurement Questionnaire, a widely used instrument to describe health states in
medical research (Rutten-van Mölken, et al. 1995). We selected the health state back
pain, because it is a familiar condition and participants were likely to know people14
suffering from it. Full health was defined as no limitations on any of the four
dimensions.
Table 3 displays the five trade-offs between years with back pain and years in
full health. The first attribute is duration and the second health status (BP stands for
back pain and FH for full health). A possible problem in these types of questions is
that people always respond in round numbers, e.g. multiples of five. To reduce this
problem, we did not use multiples of five as first-stage stimulus values.  We only used
durations less than forty years to avoid so-called “ceiling effects.” We learnt from the
pilot sessions that participants find it hard to perceive living for very long durations,
say sixty additional years. Such perception problems act against loss aversion which
predicts that participants’ second-stage response should exceed the first-stage stimulus
value.
The final columns of Table 3 display the predicted responses according to the
reference dependent model with loss aversion (RDM) and according to the contingent
trade-off model (CTO). These predictions are derived in a similar way as Table 1.
Table 3: The Back Pain Questions





1 [13,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] [y1¢¢,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] y1¢¢ > 13 y1¢¢ = 13
2 [19,BP] vs [x1¢,,FH] [y1¢¢,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] y1¢¢ > 19 y1¢¢ = 19
3 [24,BP] vs [x1¢,,FH] [y1¢¢,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] y1¢¢ > 24 y1¢¢ = 24
4 [31,BP] vs [x1¢,,FH] [y1¢¢,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] y1¢¢ > 31 y1¢¢ = 31
5 [38,BP] vs [x1¢,,FH] [y1¢¢,BP] vs [x1¢,FH] y1¢¢ > 38 y1¢¢ = 3815
Group 2: Migraine questions
In the second group of questions, participants were asked to make trade-offs
between duration and the number of days per month they suffer from migraine.
Hence, health status was quantitative and both tests of loss aversion and scale
compatibility were possible. Table 4 gives the description of migraine, for which we
again used the Maastricht Utility Measurement Questionnaire. Migraine was selected
as health status, because it is a relatively common disease and participants were likely
to know people suffering from it.
Table 4: The description of migraine
Unable to perform normal tasks at home and/or at work
Able to perform all self care activities (eating, bathing, dressing)
Unable to participate in any type of leisure activity
Severe headache
Table 5 displays the migraine questions asked. The first attribute denotes
duration and the second the number of days with migraine per month. Again, we
avoided round numbers in the first stage and durations longer than 40 years. Six trade-
offs were asked in the first experimental session. Three questions used duration as the
response scale and three questions used days with migraine as the response scale. In
the second session, ten trade-offs were asked. Questions 6 to 11 test loss aversion with
scale compatibility constant. Questions 12 and 13 test scale compatibility with loss
aversion constant. Questions 14 and 15 test the joint effect of scale compatibility and
loss aversion in trade-offs where they make opposite predictions. Questions 12-1516
used the first-stage responses from questions 6-11. The predictions according to the
reference dependent model with loss aversion and the contingent trade-off model are
displayed in the final two columns of the table.
Table 5: The Migraine Questions





6 [16,3] vs [x1¢,8] [y1¢¢,3] vs [x1¢,8] y1¢¢ > 16 y1¢¢ = 16
7 [19,8] vs [x1¢,4] [y1¢¢,8] vs [x1¢,4] y1¢¢ > 19 y1¢¢ = 19
8 [34,13] vs [x1¢,4] [y1¢¢,13] vs [x1¢,4] y1¢¢ > 34 y1¢¢ = 34
9 [22,4] vs [28, x2¢] [22, y2¢¢] vs [28, x2¢] y2¢¢ < 4 y2¢¢ = 4
10 [26,8] vs [17, x2¢] [26, y2¢¢] vs [17, x2¢] y2¢¢ < 8 y2¢¢ = 8
11 [32,8] vs [20, x2¢] [32, y2¢¢] vs [20, x2¢] y2¢¢ < 8 y2¢¢ = 8
12 [34,13] vs [x1¢,4] [34,13] vs [x1¢, x2¢¢] x2¢¢ = 4 4 < x2¢¢ < 13
13 [22,4] vs [28,x2¢] [22,4] vs [x1¢¢, x2¢] x1¢¢ = 28 22 < x1¢¢ < 28
14 [16,3] vs [x1¢,8] [16, y2¢¢] vs [x1¢,8] y2¢¢ < 3 3 < y2¢¢ < 8
15 [26,8] vs [17, x2¢] [ y1¢¢,8] vs [17, x2¢] y1¢¢ > 26 17 < y1¢¢ < 26
Group 3: Car accident questions
In the third group of questions, health status was also quantitative. Participants
were told that they had experienced a car accident as a result of which they are
temporarily unable to walk. To restore their ability to walk, participants have to
undergo rehabilitation therapy for some time. Rehabilitation sessions last 2 hours per
day and result in moderate to severe pain for a couple of hours after the rehabilitation
sessions. Participants were asked to elicit indifference between two types of therapy,17
described as intensive and less intensive therapy, that differ in the time that elapses
until participants are able to walk again and the number of hours of pain after the
rehabilitation sessions.
Table 6 displays the car accident questions. The first attribute denotes years
until being able to walk again and the second the number of hours of pain after the
rehabilitation sessions. Four trade-offs were asked in the first experimental session. In
the second session, eight trade-offs were asked. Questions 16 to 19 test loss aversion
while holding scale compatibility constant. Questions 20 and 21 test scale
compatibility while holding loss aversion constant. Questions 22 and 23 test the joint
effect of scale compatibility and loss aversion in trade-offs where they make opposite
predictions. Questions 20-23 used the first-stage responses from questions 16-19. The
predictions according to the reference dependent model with loss aversion and the
contingent trade-off model are displayed in the final two columns of the table.
Table 6: The Car Accident Questions





16 [3,5] vs [x1¢,2] [y1¢¢,5] vs [x1¢,2] y1¢¢ < 3 y1¢¢ = 3
17 [4,2] vs [x1¢,3.5] [y1¢¢,2] vs [x1¢,3.5] y1¢¢ < 4 y1¢¢ = 4
18 [3,6] vs [7, x2¢] [3, y2¢¢] vs [7, x2¢] y2¢¢ < 6 y2¢¢ = 6
19 [5,2] vs [1.5, x2¢] [5, y2¢¢] vs [1.5, x2¢] y2¢¢ < 2 y2¢¢ = 2
20 [3,5] vs [x1¢,2] [3,5] vs [x1¢, x2¢¢] x2¢¢ = 5 2 < x2¢¢ < 5
21 [5,2] vs [1.5,x2¢] [5,2] vs [x1¢¢, x2¢] x1¢¢ = 1.5 1.5 < x1¢¢ < 5
22 [4,2] vs [x1¢,3.5] [4, y2¢¢] vs [x1¢,3.5] y2¢¢ < 2 2 < y2¢¢ < 3.518
23 [3,6] vs [7, x2¢] [ y1¢¢,6] vs [7, x2¢] y1¢¢ < 3 3 < y1¢¢ < 7
 Methods
To avoid order effects, we varied the order in which the three groups of
questions were administered. Similarly, within each group the order of the questions
was varied.
Recruitment of participants took place one week before the actual experiment
started. After recruitment, we gave participants three practice questions, one from
each group. Participants were asked to answer these practice questions at home before
coming to the experiment. This procedure was selected to familiarize participants with
the questions. Prior to each group of questions, participants were asked whether they
had experienced any problems in answering the practice question that corresponded to
that group. Participants were then asked to explain their answer to the practice
question. This allowed a test of whether participants had understood the questions. In
case we were not convinced that participants had understood the question, we went
over the task again until we were convinced participants understood the task.
Indifferences were elicited by a choice bracketing procedure. Participants
reported their answers by filling in a table, as shown in Appendix B. At any time
during the interview, participants were allowed to check earlier responses and to
adjust these if desired. It is crucial for our test of the reference-dependent model that
participants interpret the option in which both parameters are given as their reference
point. We took special care to  formulate the questions in such a way that ambiguities
about the reference point were ruled out. We consistently referred to the option in
which both parameters were given as the participant’s current health state and to the
option in which a parameter had to be specified as the health state to which the19
participant could change to. The choice-bracketing procedure used three answer
categories: “I prefer my current health state,” “I want to change to the other health
state,” and “I am indifferent between my current health state and a change to the other
health state.” After each question the participants were asked to confirm the elicited
indifference value. The final comparison was displayed once again and participants
were asked whether they agreed that the two options were equivalent. Appendix B
shows the formulation of the “back pain questions”. A similar format was used for the
“migraine questions” and the “car accident questions.”
The trade-offs used in this study are hypothetical. We do not believe that the
hypothetical nature of the outcomes is problematic. Several studies have shown that
people’s responses to hypothetical and real tasks do not differ in a systematic way
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Camerer 1995, Beattie and Loomes 1997, Camerer and
Hogarth 1999). More specifically, previous studies on loss aversion demonstrated its
effect on preferences both in hypothetical (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, Samuelson
and Zeckhauser 1988,  McDaniels 1992,  Jones-Lee, et al. 1995) and in real tasks
(Tversky and Kahneman 1991, Bateman et al. 1997).
In the introduction we mentioned that one of the aims of our study is to elicit
“well-contemplated preferences.” Let us summarize the steps we took to try and elicit
such well-contemplated preferences: (i) several pilot sessions were organized in an
attempt to develop an appropriate questionnaire; (ii) familiar health states were used;
(iii) participants received practice questions to take home and had to explain their
answers to these practice questions; (iv) personal interviews were used; (v) choice
bracketing was used to elicit indifference; (vi) an indifference confirmation procedure
was used.20
Results
One participant was excluded from the analyses because he did not answer all
the questions. Because the tests of loss aversion and scale compatibility require
attribute monotonicity, those participants who violated attribute monotonicity were
excluded in each of the groups of questions. This left 42, 46, and 38 participants in the
analyses of the back pain, migraine, and car accident questions respectively.
1
Tests of loss aversion
Back pain questions
Figure 3: Loss Aversion in the Back Pain Questions
Figure 3 shows the difference between the second stage response and the first
stage stimulus value expressed as a proportion of the first stage stimulus value for the
five back pain questions. The solid arrows show the direction of the difference that is
predicted by the reference-dependent model with loss aversion. The figure shows
                                                
1 Thirty participants satisfied attribute monotonicity in all three groups of questions. The data














significant evidence of loss aversion. The figure also shows that the impact of loss
aversion is not constant but decreases with duration. Loss aversion is significant in the
first three back pain questions, but not in the final two questions. An explanation of
why loss aversion decreases with duration may be that the substitutability of health
status and duration increases with duration. Empirical studies have shown that loss
aversion decreases with increases in substitutability ( Ortona and Scacciati 1992,
Chapman 1998). Mc Neil et al. (1981) found that the substitutability between health
status and duration increases with duration. They observed that people are unwilling
to trade duration for improved health status if duration is low. If duration increases,
however, people become more prepared to trade-off duration and health status.
At the individual level, we find that most participants do not behave
consistently according to the reference dependent model with loss aversion. Thirteen
participants are uniformly loss averse, i.e., they behaved according to the predictions
of the reference-dependent model with loss aversion in each question. One participant
is uniformly gain seeking, i.e., he behaved contrary to the predictions of the reference-
dependent model with loss aversion in each question. This preference pattern implies
that the participant gives more weight to gains than to losses of the same size, hence
the term gain seeking.
Migraine questions
Figure 4: Loss Aversion in the Migraine Questions22
Figure 4 shows the results for the migraine questions. Note from Table 5 that
duration increases in questions 6-8. Hence, we observe again that the degree of loss
aversion decreases with duration. The pattern observed in Questions 9-11 is mixed. In
question 10 there is significant loss aversion, in questions 9 there is a significant
deviation in the opposite direction and in question 12 no significant difference exists
between second stage response and first stage stimulus value. An explanation for the
mixed evidence in questions 9-11 can be that participants were confused that the
response scale in these questions (number of days with migraine) was such that lower
values were preferred whereas on the other response scale (duration) higher values
were preferred. Against this explanation pleads, however, that the number of
violations of attribute monotonicity, a symptom of confusion in our opinion, is lowest
in the migraine questions.
The mixed evidence with respect to loss aversion is reflected in the individual
data. Only two participants are uniformly loss averse. No participant is uniformly gain
seeking. Hence, we observe again that for most participants the effect of loss aversion


















Figure 5: Loss Aversion in the Car Accident Questions
Figure 5 shows the results for the car accident questions. The reference-
dependent model with loss aversion predicts a negative proportion in each question, as
indicated by the solid arrows. This prediction is confirmed, but the difference between
second-stage response and first stage stimulus value is only significant in two
questions. Again, we observe at the individual level that most participants do not
behave consistently according to the reference dependent model with loss aversion,
but that there are trade-offs in which participants are loss averse and trade-offs in
which participants are gain seeking. Six participants are uniformly loss averse. No
participant is uniformly gain seeking.
Tests of scale compatibility


















Both the migraine questions and the car accident questions contained two tests
of scale compatibility with loss aversion constant. Figure 6 displays the difference
between second stage response and first stage stimulus value as a proportion of the
first stage stimulus value. The open arrows indicate the direction of the difference
predicted by the contingent trade-off model with scale compatibility. Three out of four
tests support the contingent trade-off model with scale compatibility. In Question 13,
however, the bias is in the opposite direction. Hence, we observe mixed results on
scale compatibility in the migraine questions. Again, this may be due to the different
“sign” of the reponse scales in the migraine questions.
There is only one participant behaves uniformly according to the contingent
trade-off model with scale compatibility, i.e. his responses are in the direction
predicted by the model in all four questions. No participant behaves opposite to the
model in all four questions. Hence, the effect of scale compatibility depends on the
trade-off for almost all participants.




















Figure 7: Loss Aversion and Scale Compatibility in the Migraine and Car
Accident Questions
Four tests, two in the migraine questions and two in the car accident questions,
test the joint impact of loss aversion and scale compatibility. Figure 7 shows the
results. As before, solid arrows indicate the predictions of the reference-dependent
model with loss aversion and open arrows indicate the predictions of the contingent
trade-off model with scale compatibility. Figure 7 shows that the relative sizes of the
biases due to loss aversion and scale compatibility depend on the trade-off. In three
































compatibility. However, the difference is only significant in Question 15. In particular
in Question 22 the effects of loss aversion and scale compatibility more or less
compensate each other.
The individual data confirm that the relative strengths of the biases due to loss
aversion and scale compatibility are not constant but vary over trade-offs. There are
only 2 participants for whom the effect of loss aversion dominates the effect of scale
compatibility in all 4 questions. There is no participant for whom the effect of scale
compatibility dominates the effect of loss aversion in all 4 questions.
5. Conclusion
The overall message of the paper is positive for prescriptive decision analysis.
The finding that loss aversion is not constant and that people are not consistently loss
averse suggests that it is possible to identify decision contexts that are hardly affected
by loss aversion. The identification of such decision contexts may allow the
measurement of utilities without the distorting impact of loss aversion. For example,
our results suggest that health utility measurement should rely on trade-offs between
health status and duration where duration is relatively long, because the effect of loss
aversion decreases with duration. The results on the joint effect of loss aversion and
scale compatibility show that there exist trade-offs in which loss aversion and scale
compatibility approximately outweigh each other. Future research should examine to
what extent our preliminary findings on the joint efect of loss aversion and scale
compatibility can be generalized. By identifying situations in which the two effects
cancel out, it may become possible to obtain utilities that are approximately free of the
distorting influences of loss aversion and scale compatibility.27
Appendix A: Derivation of the empirical tests
Throughout this appendix superscripts ¢ and ¢¢ denote first-stage respectively
second-stage responses. We consider three cases depending on which parameter is
used to elicit indifference in the second stage. Recall that it is assumed that on both
attributes higher levels are preferred to lower levels and that x2 < y2.
CASE 1: y1 is used to elicit indifference in the second stage.
In this case the first attribute is still used as the response scale, but the
outcome in which both parameters are held fixed changes from x to y. The contingent
trade-off model predicts that y1
¢¢ = y1, because the response scale does not change and,
thus, the second stage yields ( x1
¢, x 2)  ~1 ( y1
¢¢
  , y 2).  y1
¢¢ = y 1 then follows from
transitivity of ~1 and attribute monotonicity.
According to the reference-dependent model, the reference point shifts from y
to x and the second stage elicits (x1
¢, x2) ~x (y1
¢¢, y2). Let z denote the point (x1
¢, x2). By
loss aversion, the first stage indifference (x1
¢, x2) ~y (y1, y 2) implies (x1
¢, x2) ￿z (y1, y 2).
Let (x1
¢, x2) ~z (z1, y2). Such a z1 exists, because X1 is a connected topological space
and ¸ is continous. By attribute monotonicity z1 > y 1. Loss aversion also implies that
if (y1
¢¢, y2) ~x ( ¢ x1 ,x2) then (y1
¢¢, y2) ￿z ( ¢ x1 ,x2). By transitivity, (y1
¢¢, y2) ￿z (z1, y 2) and by
attribute monotonicity y1
¢¢ > z1 > y1.
CASE 2: x2 is used to elicit indifference in the second stage.28
In this case, y is still the outcome in which both parameters are given, but the
response scale changes from the first to the second attribute. The reference-dependent
model predicts that  x2
¢¢ = x 2. This follows straightforwardly from transitivity of  ~y,
attribute monotonicity, and the second-stage indifference (x1
¢, x2
¢¢) ~y (y1, y2).
According to the contingent trade-off model, the second stage elicits (x1
¢, x2
¢¢)
~2 (y1, y2). By attribute monotonicity, y2 > x2
¢¢  and thus by scale compatibility (x1
¢, x2
¢¢)
￿1 (y1, y2). The first stage yielded (x1




transitivity of ¸1. Attribute monotonicity implies x2
¢¢ > x2.
CASE 3: y2 is used as the second-stage response scale.
In this case, there is both a shift in the reference point from y to x and a change
in the attribute that is used as the response scale. We show that the reference-
dependent model and the contingent trade-off model yield conflicting predictions. The
reference-dependent model predicts that y2
¢¢ > y 2. Let z denote the point (x1
¢, y 2). By
loss aversion, the first stage indifference (x1
¢, x2) ~y (y1, y 2) implies (x1
¢, x2) ￿z (y1, y 2).
Let z 2 be such that (x1
¢, x2) ~z (y1, z2). z2 exists by conectedness of X2 and continuity
of ¸. z2 > y2 by attribute monotonicity. Loss aversion implies that if (x1




¢, x2). Because (x1
¢, x2) ~z (y1, z 2), attribute monotonicity implies
that y2
¢¢ > z2. Hence, y2
¢¢ > y2.




¢¢ > x2 by attribute monotonicity. By scale compatibility, (x1
¢, x2) ￿1 (y1,
y2
¢¢). (x1
¢, x2) ￿1 (y1, y2
¢¢) and the first stage indifference (x1
¢, x2) ~1 (y1, y2) imply (y1, y2)
￿1 (y1, y2
¢¢) by transitivity of ¸1. Hence, y2
¢¢ > y2 by attribute monotonicity.29
Appendix B: Formulation of the back pain question
Suppose that you have 13 more years to live with back pain. In this question
you are asked to state the number of years in full health that you consider equivalent
to living for 13 more years with back pain. That is, you have to determine the number
Y that makes the following two options equivalent:
1. Living for 13 years with back pain. After these 13 years you die.
2. Living for Y years in full health. After these Y years you die.




to situation 2 DECISION






I remain in 1 I am indifferent
between 1 and 2
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